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A central tenet of asset pricing theory is that capital will be allocated in such a 
way that risk-adjusted returns are equalized across assets.  The level of expected stock 
returns should vary cross-sectionally according to the level of firms' exposure to 
systematic risks.  Implications for changes in expected returns follow directly from the 
theory in levels.  Whenever there is a change in the level of systematic risk, stock prices 
should change in such a way that risk-adjusted returns are equalized once again. 
This prediction is testable empirically.  In recent years a number of countries have 
undertaken stock market liberalizations.  A stock market liberalization is a decision by a 
country’s government to allow foreigners to purchase shares in that country’s stock 
market.  Opening the stock market to foreign investors enables domestic agents in a small 
open economy to share risk with the rest of the world.  Since liberalizations alter the set 
of non-diversifiable risks for the representative investor, stock prices should move in line 
with the change in systematic risk. 
It is important to understand whether stock prices respond to changes in 
systematic risk, because stock prices provide public signals of real investment 
opportunities (Fischer and Merton, 1984; Morck, 2000; Stulz, 1999a; Tobin and 
Brainard, 1977; Summers, 1985). If liberalization decreases the riskiness of a firm, then, 
all else equal, its stock price should increase.  This price increase signals to managers that 
they can increase shareholder welfare by investing in physical capital.  On the other hand, 
if liberalizations are associated with stock price increases that are unrelated to changes in 
risk, then the optimal investment response is less clear (Blanchard, Rhee and Summers, 
1993; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990).  Therefore, an empirical analysis of whether   2
stock prices move in line with changes in systematic risk also provides a first step toward 
understanding whether physical investment is efficiently reallocated when barriers to 
capital movements are removed. 
This paper focuses on an experiment in which the level of systematic risk changes 
unexpectedly and examines whether expected returns move in a direction that is 
consistent with the theory.  Specifically, firm-level, cross-country data are used to 
evaluate whether the stock price revaluations that occur when emerging economies open 
their stock markets to foreign investors are driven by changes in risk.  The capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) predicts that two effects will drive the stock price revaluation of 
each publicly traded firm within a given country (Stulz, 1999a, b, c).  The first effect is 
common to all firms: a fall in the risk-free rate as the country moves from financial 
autarky to financial integration with the rest of the world (Lucas, 1990).  The second 
effect is specific to any given firm.  The greater the covariance of a firm’s stock return 
with the local market relative to the covariance of its returns with the world market, the 
larger the firm-specific component of that firm’s stock price revaluation. 
When countries liberalize their stock markets, some publicly listed firms become 
eligible for foreign ownership (investible firms), while others remain off limits (non-
investible firms).  This investible/non-investible aspect of the data generates two testable 
implications of the theory.  First, take two firms that are identical except that one is 
investible and the other is non-investible.  Theory predicts that the revaluation effect for 
the investible firm should be more strongly related to its covariance structure of returns 
than in the case of the non-investible firm.  Second, the fall in the risk-free rate effect is a 
common shock to all firms in the economy.  Therefore, this effect should be the same   3
across investible and non-investible firms.  This second implication provides a further 
consistency check of the theory. 
Panel data estimations show that the data are consistent with both of these 
predictions.  The firm-specific revaluations of investible securities are significantly 
related to the difference in the covariance of their returns with the local and world 
markets.  An investible firm, whose historical covariance with the local market exceeds 
that with the world market by 0.01, will experience a firm-specific revaluation of 3.4 
percent when the stock market is liberalized.  In contrast, there is no firm-specific 
revaluation for non-investible firms.  The estimations also confirm that the common 
shock is indeed the same for investible and non-investible firms, as predicted by the 
theory. 
The use of firm-level data in this paper departs from studies that use aggregate 
data to document the stock market revaluation that occurs when emerging economies 
liberalize (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000a; Kim and Singal, 2000).  The 
evidence in these papers suggests that liberalizations substantially reduce the cost of 
capital.  However, these papers are silent about whether this reduction stems from 
increased risk sharing.  In principle, the observed revaluations could be driven entirely by 
changes in the risk-free rate.  The problem is that we observe only one aggregate stock 
price revaluation per country when stock market liberalizations occur.  This means that 
analyses of aggregate data do not provide sufficient degrees of freedom to disentangle the 
contribution of changes in the risk-free rate from those of risk sharing.
1  In contrast, firm-
level data provide more than sufficient degrees of freedom with which to disentangle the 
                                                 
1 This is a specific example of the more general point made by Stulz (1995a).  Tests based on stock market 
indices have limited power in assessing the importance of barriers to international investment.   4
common shock from that of the risk-sharing effect, thereby enabling the data to speak to 
the issue of whether diversification drives the revaluation of domestic securities. 
However, the results need to be interpreted with caution, because the natural 
experiment studied in this paper has some limitations.  The decision to liberalize may be 
endogenous.  Policy makers may choose to open up when the stock market is doing well.  
In aggregate studies, endogeneity may result in upward-biased estimates of the mean 
liberalization effect.  With cross-country, firm-level data, this bias should be picked up by 
the country-specific fixed effects.  However, if the bias also has a component that is 
correlated with the firm-specific covariance structure of returns, then the point estimates 
may overstate the magnitude of the portion of the total revaluation effect induced by risk 
sharing.  On the other hand, the results may understate the full impact of liberalization on 
stock prices, because the revaluation is measured as the stock price change that occurs on 
the implementation date.  Liberalizations may be anticipated by the market, and prices 
may have adjusted prior to that date. 
Finally, stock price revaluations may be driven by changes in discount rates or 
expected future cash flows.  Unexpected stock price changes are a reasonable proxy for 
changes in required rates of return only if earnings growth is unaltered by liberalization.  
However, liberalizations may affect expected future cash flows.  If this is the case, then 
firms may experience stock price revaluations that are unrelated to discount rates.  The 
analysis controls for expected future profitability by using firm-level data on the actual 
growth rate of real earnings per share following liberalizations.  Studies that focus on 
aggregate data use variables such as GDP growth rates to proxy for expected future cash 
flows.  In comparison, firm-level data on actual earnings growth outcomes would seem to   5
provide a more direct, albeit imperfect, measure of future earnings prospects.   
Despite these limitations, studying this liberalization experiment through the lens 
of the stock market has at least two advantages.  First, there is ample evidence that an 
unbiased assessment of the effects of public information releases is incorporated into 
stock prices (Fama, 1976).  In particular, stock prices in the subset of countries relevant 
for this paper respond to news of major economic policy reforms (Henry, 2000a, b).  
Second, the stock market evidence is useful for evaluating whether theories of risk 
sharing have any empirical relevance.  For example, although the revaluation estimates 
are noisy, they are economically and statistically significant.  This fact suggests that risk 
sharing may be of quantitative importance. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
motivation and presents descriptive evidence.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 
outlines the empirical methodology and reports the results.  Section 5 discusses the 
results, their relationship to previous studies on international risk sharing and potential 
implications for future work in asset pricing and macroeconomics. 
 
2. Theoretical Motivation and Descriptive Findings 
The analysis builds on Stulz (1999c).  Assume a small country whose equity 
market is completely segmented from world equity markets.  Investors are risk-averse 
and care only about the expected return of their investment and the variance of that 
return.  Also assume that all investors have identical risk aversion.  With this last 
assumption, the price of risk in the country is a constant, which we denote by γ .  Since 
the country’s investors care only about the expected return and volatility of their invested   6
wealth and that country’s capital market is segmented from the rest of the world, it 
follows that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) holds for that country.  This implies 
that the aggregate risk premium on the small country’s equity market before stock market 
liberalization is 
2 () * Mf M Rrσ γ −= , where  M R  is the expected return on the market,  f r  
is the risk-free rate, and 
2
M σ  is the variance of the return on the small country’s market 
portfolio.  It follows that the risk premium for a given firm i before liberalization is 
2
iM M β σ γ , where  iM β  is the beta coefficient of firm i before liberalization.  Therefore, 
we may write:  
2 [] i f iM M ER r β σ γ =+                                                          (1) 
Where  [] i ER  is the required rate of return on firm  ' is  stock. 
 
2A.  Complete Liberalization 
Now consider the impact on firm  ' is  required rate of return when the country 
opens its stock market to the rest of the world and also allows its residents to invest 
abroad.  Assume also that the expected value and variance of the profits from domestic 
production activities are not affected by liberalization.  To eliminate the impact of 
differences in risk aversion, also assume that all investors in the world have the same 
constant relative risk aversion.   
As a country opens up its stock market to foreign investors and lets its residents 
invest abroad, the residents of the country no longer have to bear all of the risks 
associated with the economic activities of the country.  After liberalization, the small 
country’s equity market becomes part of the global equity market and expands the   7
diversification opportunities for foreign investors.  Since the country is small, adding that 
country to the world portfolio does not increase the risk premium on the world market 
portfolio. 
Let us assume that the liberalization is symmetric in the sense that now domestic 
residents can also invest abroad for purposes of international diversification.  With 
completely open capital markets, the capital asset pricing model holds for the global 
equity market, so that the risk premium on any risky asset depends on its beta coefficient 
with respect to the world market portfolio.  Let 
* [] i ER  be the required rate of return on 
firm i in the integrated capital market equilibrium.  It follows that 
** * [] ( ) if i W W f ER r R r β =+ −                                                              (2) 
where  iW β  denotes firm i’s beta with the world market,  W R  denotes the expected real 
rate of return on the world equity market portfolio and 
*
f r  the world risk-free rate.  The 
risk premium on the world market portfolio is 
*2 [] Wf W ER r γ σ −= , where 
2
W σ  is the 
variance of the return on the world portfolio.  Therefore, the required rate of return on 
firm i after liberalization is given by 
** 2 [] i f iW W ER r β σ γ =+                                                          (3) 
The link between the liberalization-induced change in the required rate of return 
on firm i and its diversification properties can now be made transparent by subtracting 
equation (3) from equation (1).  Performing a few steps of algebra and using the 
definitions of local and world betas yields the following result: 
** [] []( ) ii i f f RE RE R rr D I F C O V γ ∆= − = − +                                                          (4)   8
Where  i R ∆  is the change in the required rate of return on impact and 
[( , ) ( , ) ] iM iW DIFCOV Cov R R Cov R R =− .  Equation (4) highlights the two channels 
through which liberalization affects firm-level required rates of return.  The first effect, a 
change in the risk-free rate, is common to all firms.
2  The second effect of liberalization is 
idiosyncratic to firm i and depends on the quantity in brackets on the right-hand side of 
equation (4): the covariance of firm i’s stock return with the local market minus the 
covariance of firm i’s stock return with the world market.   
 
2B.  Partial Liberalization 
In practice, when countries liberalize, only some firms become eligible for foreign 
ownership.  What drives the change in the required rate of return for the non-investible 
securities?  The risk associated with holding a single non-investible security before 
liberalization depends on its covariance with the entire domestic market.  The risk 
associated with holding a non-investible security after liberalization depends on its 
covariance with the portfolio of non-investible securities (Errunza and Losq, 1985).   
Therefore, the change in the required rate of return for the non-investible security will 
depend on the difference between the two covariances.  Specifically, define the variable 
DIFCOV1 as  1[ (, ) (, ) ] iM iN DIFCOV Cov R R Cov R R =−  where  N R  is the expected return 
on the portfolio of non-investible securities.  All else equal, the repricing of the non-
investible securities should be positively correlated with DIFCOV1.   
                                                 
2 A priori, the impact of this common shock may be ambiguous.  If countries are capital scarce in autarky, 
the average cost of capital may fall if the liberalization results in a net capital inflow.  On the other hand, if 
countries have followed policies of financial repression and interest rates were kept artificially low, the 
average cost of capital may increase if the stock market liberalization is accompanied by domestic financial 
deregulation.  See Henry (2000b) for a more detailed discussion of these issues. 
   9
 
2C.  Mapping Theory to Data: Descriptive Findings 
Under the assumption that firms’ expected future cash flows are unaffected by 
liberalization, the unexpected response of firm  ' is  stock price to news of the 
liberalization will mirror the change in the required rate of return on firm  ' is  stock.  The 
stock price will increase if liberalization lowers the required rate of return, and 
conversely, the stock price will decrease if liberalization raises the required rate of return.  
Accordingly, the unexpected stock price response to liberalization can be used as a proxy 
measure for confronting the theory with data.   
Specifically, equation (4) predicts that the revaluation will have an intercept effect 
and a slope effect.  The intercept term should be the same across investible and non-
investible firms within a given country.  However, in order to test the theory we pool the 
data from several countries.  The intercept term in this pooled sample should be the same, 
only after controlling for country-fixed effects.  Therefore, the intercept term should be 
ignored in the description of the raw data.  Examination of the intercept is deferred until 
Section 4, which does control for country-fixed effects. Equation (4) also predicts that the 
revaluation should be an increasing function of DIFCOV for the investible firms.
3  
Figure 1 reveals that the stock price revaluation for investible firms is an 
increasing function of DIFCOV, as theory predicts.  It plots the unexpected stock price 
change for investible firms on the y-axis and DIFCOV on the x-axis.  The statistical 
relationship between the revaluation of investible firms and DIFCOV is given by the 
following equation (robust t-statistics in parentheses, R-Squared= 0.27, N=248): 
                                                 
3 Since the coefficient of relative risk aversion is assumed to be the same across countries, the slope 
coefficient is also implicitly the same and therefore does not require a country-specific adjustment.   10
ln( [0]) 0.05 9.20*
Investible
ij ij StockPrice DIFCOV ∆= − +                                          (5) 
                                                (-1.3)  (4.0) 
 
where  ln( [0])
Investible
ij StockPrice ∆  is the liberalization-month stock price change for 
investible firm i in country  j .   
Figure 2 presents the scatter plot for non-investible firms.  The statistical 
relationship between the revaluation of non-investible firms and DIFCOV is given by the 
following equation (robust t-statistics in parentheses, R-Squared= 0.06, N=181): 
ln( [0]) 0.053 3.69*
Non Investible
ij ij StockPrice DIFCOV
− ∆= +                                    (6) 
(3.2) (2.3) 
 
Like Figure 1, this graph also reveals a positive statistical relationship between the 
revaluation of non-investible firms and DIFCOV. 
However, there are also some distinct differences between Figure 1 and Figure 2.  
First, the positive relationship between the revaluation and DIFCOV is more pronounced 
for investible firms (Figure 1) than non-investible firms (Figure 2).  The slope of the line 
in equation (5) is 9.20 whereas the slope of the line in equation (6) is 3.69.  Second, the 
difference in covariance explains almost 30 percent of the cross-sectional variation in 
investible firms’ stock price revaluations, but only 6 percent for non-investible firms.  
Thus, a first pass at the data indicates that DIFCOV has more predictive power for the 
revaluation of investible firms than non-investible firms.   
Figure 3 examines whether the repricing of non-investible firms is related to the 
difference between their covariance with the local market portfolio and their covariances 
with the entire portfolio of non-investible securities.  Figure 3 plots the unexpected stock 
price change for investible firms on the y-axis and DIFCOV1 on the x-axis.  The 
statistical relationship between the revaluation of non-investible firms and DIFCOV1 is   11
given by the following equation (robust t-statistics in parentheses, R-Squared= 0.01, 
N=181): 
ln( [0]) 0.07 1.44* 1
Non Investible
ij ij StockPrice DIFCOV
− ∆= +                                    (7) 
(3.6) (1.5) 
 
It appears that DIFCOV1 has no explanatory power for the repricing of non-investible 
securities.  
This initial perusal of the data suggests that there are differences between 
investible and non-investible firms, but only so much can be inferred from pictures.   
Section 4 of the paper pools the data for both sets of firms and formally tests for 
differences between the two sets of firms.  For that matter, both figures should be treated 
with caution because they merely plot the raw data.  For example, the unexpected stock 
price change is a reasonable proxy for the change in required return if earnings growth is 
unchanged by liberalization.  If this assumption is not reasonable, then it may be 
important to control for changes in the expected growth rate of earnings. 
Additionally, there is a more general concern.  The goal is to estimate the impact 
of liberalization on a randomly selected firm from the population of all firms.  If the 
investible firms are not randomly selected, then they may have unobservable 
characteristics that cause them to respond differently to liberalization than non-investible 
firms.  These issues can be explored more transparently once the data have been 
described in more detail.  This data description takes place in the next section of the 
paper. 
 
3.  Data   12
This section of the paper discusses the data in some detail.  The analysis requires 
three types of data: stock returns for the countries in question; stock market liberalization 
dates; a means of discriminating between those firms that become eligible for foreign 
ownership when the market is liberalized and those that do not.  Section 3A describes the 
basic stock returns data.  Section 3B gives the stock market liberalization dates.  Section 
3C explains the procedure for discriminating between investible and non-investible firms.  
Section 3D presents descriptive statistics on the two sets of firms.  Section 3E discusses 
the potential importance of selection bias issues in examining investible versus non-
investible firms. 
 
3A.  The Basic Stock Returns Series 
The principal source of stock market data is the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB).
4 Stock price indices for 
individual firms are the dividend-inclusive, U.S. dollar-denominated, IFC Global Index 
(IFCG).  The IFC selects stocks for inclusion in the IFCG index by reviewing a stock’s 
trading activity.  Any share selected must be among the most actively traded shares in 
terms of value traded during the annual review period; it must have traded frequently 
during the review period (i.e., one large block trade might skew the value traded 
statistics); and it must have reasonable prospects for a continued trading presence in the 
stock exchange (e.g., it must not be in imminent danger of being suspended or delisted).  
Stocks are selected in order of trading criteria until the market capitalization coverage 
target of 60 percent to 75 percent of total market capitalization is met.  Once the actively 
                                                 
4 IFC data is used instead of Morgan Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) data, because MSCI company level 
coverage for emerging markets begins only in January 1992 and therefore post-dates almost all of the 
liberalizations.  Worldscope coverage begins even later than MSCI coverage.   13
traded and market capitalization requirements are met, IFC analysts may suggest 
substituting one company’s shares for another on the list if the suggested shares have 
reasonably similar trading characteristics, but represent an industry group which may be 
underrepresented in the current composition of the IFCG index (IFC, 1999).  
In order to be included in the sample, a firm must have been actively traded for at 
least five years prior to the liberalization date.  This ensures that there are at least five 
years worth of data with which to calculate historical covariances.  Each country’s U.S. 
dollar-denominated total return index is deflated by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI), 
which comes from the IFS.  All of the data are monthly.  Returns are calculated as the 
first difference of the natural logarithm of the real stock total return index. 
Calculation of the covariance of firm-level stock returns with the local and world 
markets requires data on market returns as well as firm-level returns.  For each country, 
the real, dollar-denominated IFCG Total Return Index is used as the benchmark local 
market index. The world benchmark market index is the real, dollar-denominated MSCI 
World Total Return Index. 
 
3B.  Identifying Stock Market Liberalization Dates 
A stock market liberalization is a decision by a country’s government to open its 
stock market to foreign investors.  When a stock market liberalization occurs, some of the 
firms in the domestic economy become eligible for purchase by foreigners, while others 
remain off-limits.  Establishing the liberalization date is the first step in the process of 
distinguishing between these two types of firms.  These dates are listed in Table 1.  The 
entire sample consists of 429 firms in 11 countries.  The 11 countries are: Argentina,   14
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Taiwan, Turkey, and 
Venezuela. 
 
3C. Discriminating Between Investible and Non-Investible Firms 
Investible firms are defined to be that subset of firms in the IFCG that are also in 
the IFC Investible Index (IFCI).  The IFCI’s determination of investibility is a three-step 
process.  First, the IFC determines which securities foreigners may legally hold.  Next, 
the IFC applies two further screening criteria for practicality of investment.  Both screens 
must be passed for IFCI index eligibility.  The first criterion screens for a minimum 
investible market capitalization of $50 million or more over the 12 months prior to a 
stock’s addition to an IFCI index.  This investible market capitalization is determined 
after applying the foreign investment rules and after any adjustments because of cross-
holdings or government ownership. 
The second criterion screens firms for liquidity.  A stock must trade at least $20 
million over the prior year for inclusion in an IFCI index.  It must also have traded on at 
least half the local exchange’s trading days.  Thus, the IFC Investible indexes are 
designed to measure the returns that foreign portfolio investors might receive from 
investing in emerging market securities that are legally and practically available to them. 
The IFCI was initiated in December of 1988.  This fact implies that for stock 
market liberalizations that occurred prior to December of 1988, it is not possible to 
discriminate between those firms that became investible and those that did not.  The 
countries and dates in Table 1 reflect this constraint.  Specifically, Table 1 lists the   15
earliest stock liberalization date occurring after December of 1988 for every country that 
implemented at least one country-wide stock market liberalization after this date. 
 
3D.  Descriptive Statistics on Investible and Non-Investible Firms 
The average size of DIFCOV  is 0.018 for investible firms and 0.0096 for non-
investible firms.  This feature of the data suggests that investible firms should experience 
larger revaluations than non-investible firms, given the common shock.  Table 2 explores 
whether the raw differences in the stock price revaluations of investible and non-
investible firms are roughly consistent with this prediction.  The table shows that the 
average stock price revaluation is 15.1 percent in real dollar terms for investible firms 
and 9.9 percent for non-investible firms.  The last column of the table reports that the 5.2 
percentage-point difference between these two means is statistically significant.  There 
are two possible concerns with these numbers. 
First, they are reported in dollar terms.  This choice of unit may lead to an 
overstatement of the revaluations if liberalizations are accompanied by large 
appreciations of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the dollar.  In order to see if the dollar-
denominated revaluations are driven by domestic currency gains, the behavior of 
exchange rates in the sample countries was examined.  On average, countries actually 
experience a 1.2 percent depreciation of their exchange rates during the liberalization 
month.  The average depreciation during the month after liberalization is 1.5 percent.  
This suggests that the dollar-denominated numbers may actually understate the true size 
of the revaluation in local currency terms.  Second, the numbers may understate the true   16
revaluations if the liberalization events are anticipated.
5  Analysis of returns during the 
months preceding the liberalization revealed no evidence of significant stock price 
appreciation in anticipation of the liberalizations.   
Turning to comparisons of medians, the median revaluation for investible firms is 
12.1 percent.  Forty-three of the 248 investible firms in the sample had liberalization-
month stock price changes below their median monthly stock price change.  The p-value 
is 0.00 for observing at most this many investible firms with liberalization-month stock 
price responses below their median monthly stock price change for non-liberalization 
months.
6  The median revaluation for non-investible firms is 8.6 percent.  Eighty-three of 
the 181 non-investible firms experienced liberalization-month stock price changes below 
their median monthly stock price change.  The p-value is 0.15 for observing at most this 
many stock price responses below the median.  Hence, sign tests confirm that the stock 
price revaluations for investible firms are more uniformly positive than for non-investible 
firms. 
 
3E.  Is There a Sample Selection Problem? 
Those firms that become investible may not represent a random sampling from 
the distribution of all firms in the IFCG, which are themselves not randomly selected.  To 
explore whether selection bias may prejudice the results, this section systematically 
examines the structural differences between investible and non-investible firms.   
Table 3 provides a comparison of ex-ante observable differences in investible and 
non-investible firms, as a second step in exploring the extent to which selection bias may 
                                                 
5If the news is anticipated, this biases against finding any revaluation effect. 
6 The null hypothesis is that liberalization-month stock price responses come from the same distribution as 
non-liberalization-month stock price changes.   17
prejudice inferences about the differential impact of liberalization on the two sets of 
firms.  Summary statistics on six variables are provided for investible and non-investible 
firms in the pre-liberalization period: SIZE, market capitalization as a fraction of total 
market capitalization; LIQUIDITY, the turnover rate; EARNINGS, the growth rate of 
real earnings per share; MARKET TO BOOK, the ratio of the market value of equity to 
the book value of equity; RETURN, the average real return in dollars; and DIFCOV, the 
difference in covariance between the local and world markets.  There is no significant 
difference between the size of investible and non-investible firms.  Investible firms are 
significantly more liquid than non-investible firms. 
The average growth rate of real earnings per share for investible firms is 
significantly higher than that of non-investible firms.  Investible firms also have 
significantly higher market-to-book ratios than non-investible firms.  This may indicate 
that investible firms have higher expected future profitability than non-investible firms.  
If higher market to book ratios and historical growth rates of real earnings per share 
rationally forecast that investible firms have higher expected profitability than non-
investible firms, then we should see differences in ex-post earnings growth outcomes, on 
average. 
Hence, Table 4 reports a comparison of the actual growth rate of real earnings per 
share for investible and non-investible firms in each of the three years following 
liberalization ([+1], [+2], [+3]), as a further means of exploring selection bias.  In the 
second and third years after liberalization, there are no significant differences.  In the year 
after liberalization, the growth rate of earnings per share for non-investible firms is 
significantly lower than for investible firms.  Although there are no dramatic differences   18
in ex-post profitability of investible and non-investible firms, overall the data do suggest 
that there are some differences between these two types of firms.  The empirical analysis 
in Section 4 controls directly for the influence of earnings on the revaluations, so some of 
these differences will be accounted for.  However, it is possible that these differences 
could be correlated with characteristics that influence the way in which investible and 
non-investible stock prices respond to liberalization. 
Another possible concern is the process by which firms become legally investible.  
If decisions concerning the permissibility of foreign ownership are made at the country 
level (by government officials), then stock market liberalization may be an exogenous 
event from the perspective of any given firm.  On the other hand, if legal investibility is 
determined on a firm-by-firm basis, then sample selection may be an issue.  For example, 
if a firm must lobby the government to allow foreign institutions to buy its shares, then 
those firms that are most attractive to foreigners will be most likely to engage in the 
lobbying process.  This discussion suggests that those firms that are “investible” may not 
represent a random sampling from the distribution of all firms in the IFCG.   
The extent to which liberalization may be regarded as exogenous was 
investigated.  The variation in the “degree open factor” across firms for each country was 
examined.  For 10 of the 11 countries in the sample, the degree open factor was identical 
across all firms at the time of the stock market liberalization.
7  The uniformity of the 
degree of openness across firms within a given country suggests that either the 
liberalization decision is exogenous to any given firm, or all firms within a given country 
uniformly prefer the same degree of permissible foreign ownership.  However, the 
government’s decision about which firms to make investible may be a function of firm-
                                                 
7 The exception is Brazil where the investible weights range from 5 percent to 56 percent across firms.     19
specific characteristics that determine the likely impact of liberalization on that firm, 
even if the liberalization decision is exogenous from the firm’s perspective. 
 
4.  Methodology and Empirical Results 
This section of the paper addresses the following question.  Do diversification 
fundamentals help predict the unexpected stock price change in response to the news of 
stock market liberalization?  The benchmark regression specification is as follows: 
11 2 ln( [0]) ( * ) ij ij ij ij
ji j




∆= + + +
++
          (8) 
The left-hand-side variable is the Month “0” unexpected stock price change.   
Month 0 is defined as the month in which a given stock market liberalization is 
implemented.  The IFC records the value of a country’s stock market index at the end of 
the month, and the data on liberalization events do not provide the day of the month on 
which programs are implemented.  These two facts imply that the implementation of a 
given liberalization may occur after the day of the month on which the IFC recorded 
prices.  In such cases, the change in the stock market index in month [0] may not reflect 
the news of the liberalization event.  Accordingly, the analysis looks at the cumulative 
unexpected change in the real dollar value of the stock market index in months [0, +1] as 
well as the change in month [0]. 
The unexpected stock price change for a given firm, i, is computed as the real 
dollar return for firm i in the liberalization month minus firm i’s average, pre-
liberalization, monthly return.  The symbol DIFCOV is an abbreviation for 
[( , ) ( , ) ] iM iW Cov R R Cov R R − , the difference between the historical covariance of firm i’s   20
stock return with the local market and its covariance with the MSCI world stock market 
index.  INVEST is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for investible firms and 
zero for non-investible firms.  CNTRY is a set of country specific dummies to account 
for country-fixed effects. 
This specification facilitates examination of the revaluation effect for a pooled 
group of 429 investible and non-investible firms.  The joint estimation procedure allows 
testing of the view that risk sharing drives the stock price revaluations that accompany 
stock market liberalizations for both investible and non-investible firms.  The constant 
intercept term, α , imposes the assumption that the change in the risk-free rate is the same 
across all countries, after controlling for country-fixed effects.  If the theory is correct, α , 
the average change in the risk-free rate after removing country-fixed effects, should be 
the same for investible and non-investible firms.  The coefficient on the dummy variable 
INVEST measures the marginal effect on α  of being investible.  If the theory is correct, 
the coefficient on INVEST should not be significantly different from zero. 
In principle, estimating equation (8) without country-fixed effects would yield an 
estimate of the average change in the risk-free rate across all 11 countries.  In practice, an 
estimate of α  without fixed effects could pick up other level effects related to country-
specific differences that are not addressed by the theory.  Without a clear framework for 
interpreting such differences, it seems preferable not to try and interpret the country-fixed 
effects as country-specific changes in the risk-free rate.  Rather, the empirical analysis 
simply asks whether the common shock is the same across all firms after controlling for 
country-fixed effects.     21
The usual assumption that the error term is random and uncorrelated across firms 
requires further discussion.  Equation (8) is estimated using  a panel regression with 
country-fixed effects.  In aggregating abnormal returns, the standard assumption for panel 
estimation requires that the abnormal returns on individual securities be uncorrelated in 
the cross section.  This is a reasonable assumption if there is no clustering, that is, the 
event windows of the included securities do not overlap in calendar time.  However, this 
is not true for country-wide stock market liberalizations.  All firms within a given country 
share the same liberalization date in addition to other country-specific factors.  Therefore, 
the standard assumption that abnormal returns are uncorrelated across firms may no 
longer obtain. This means that the standard distributional results for the aggregated 
abnormal returns may not be applicable in this context.  The variance-covariance matrix 
used to calculate the standard errors was adjusted to account for clustering.  The 
estimation procedure also corrects for potential heteroscedasticity across firms. 
 
4A.  Benchmark Regression Results 
Table 5 shows the results.  Panel A presents the estimates for the month [0] 
windows.  Column (1a) shows the results for the benchmark specification given by 
equation (8).  The estimate of the constant captures the common shock for both the 
investible and the non-investible firms.  The magnitude of this coefficient is 0.06 and is 
significant at the 1 percent confidence level.  The INVEST dummy is statistically 
insignificant.  This indicates that the common shock is in fact the same for both sets of 
firms, as theory would predict.   22
The intercept term was also estimated without country-fixed effects.  In this case, 
the point estimates ranged from -0.01 to 0.03, but were statistically insignificant in all 
specifications.  The standard errors on the point estimates without fixed effects were on 
the order of 0.3, as opposed to standard errors on the order of 0.01 with fixed effects.  
These numbers suggest that there is a great deal of variation in the common shock from 
country to country.  This could be due to large differences in domestic and world risk-
free rates, but it could also be due to other country-specific effects. Henceforth the 
analysis only discusses the estimates that include fixed effects. 
The coefficient on DIFCOV gives the effect of risk sharing conditional on being 
non-investible.  The sum of the coefficients on DIFCOV and DIFCOV*INVEST gives 
the total effect of risk sharing conditional on being investible.  The sum of the 
coefficients on DIFCOV and DIFCOV*INVEST in this benchmark specification is equal 
to 2.74 and is significant at the one percent confidence level.  This means that if DIFCOV 
equals 0.01, then an investible firm can expect a stock price revaluation of 0.274 or 2.74 
percent in the month that the stock market liberalization takes place.  Panel B presents the 
estimates for the month [0, +1] window.  Column (1b) shows that the conditional effect 
of DIFCOV for non-investible firms is equal to –0.4 and is statistically insignificant.  The 
conditional effect for investible firms is equal to the sum of –0.4 and 4.42, which is 4.02.  
Therefore, if DIFCOV equals 0.01, a firm can expect a total stock price revaluation of 
4.02 percent over the two-month window.  
It is also important to note that the marginal effect of DIFCOV conditional on 
being an investible firm is captured by the coefficient on DIFCOV*INVEST.  Therefore, 
the point estimates in the benchmark specifications (1a and 1b) also indicate that the   23
marginal effect of DIFCOV for investible firms is significantly different from that of the 
non-investible firms.  Overall, the empirical results from the benchmark specifications 
are consistent with the a priori theoretical predictions.  The stock price revaluation of 
investible firms is positively and significantly related to DIFCOV.  There is no significant 
statistical relationship between the stock price revaluation of non-investible firms and 
diversification fundamentals.  The finding for non-investible firms is consistent with the 
prediction in the case where the stock market liberalization does not allow domestic 
residents to invest abroad. 
4B. Controlling for Earnings Growth  
Stock price revaluations may be driven by changes in earnings or discount rates.  
If liberalization coincides with good news about earnings, then firms may experience 
stock price revaluations that are unrelated to liberalization-induced changes in the 
discount rate.  Specifications (2a) and (2b) of Table 5 explore whether the differences in 
the effect of DIFCOV on the stock price revaluation of investible and non-investible 
firms reported in specifications (1a) and (1b) are driven by shocks to the growth rate of 
earnings.  The deviation of the growth rate of earnings from its pre-liberalization mean in 
year [+1] is added to the right-hand side of equation (8) as a proxy for changes in 
expected future profitability.
8 
After controlling for earnings in Panel A, the sum of the coefficients on DIFCOV 
and DIFCOV*INVEST increases to 3.3 in column (2a).  This is up from the estimate of 
2.74 in the benchmark specification (1a).  After controlling for earnings in Panel B, the 
sum of the coefficients on DIFCOV and DIFCOV*INVEST increases to 4.5 in 
                                                 
8 Estimations were also performed using years [0], [+1], [+2], and [+3].  These results are not reported 
because earnings in [0], [+2], and [+3] have no explanatory power.   24
specification (2b).  This is greater than the estimate of 4.02 in the benchmark 
specification (1b).  The point estimate on DIFCOV, the risk-sharing effect for non-
investible firms, remains statistically insignificant in both Panel A and Panel B.  The 
coefficient on DIFCOV*INVEST in (2a) and (2b) indicate that the marginal effect of 
DIFCOV for investible firms remains significantly larger than that of the non-investible 
firms. 
4C.  Can Size or Liquidity Explain the Results? 
Regulatory guidelines within asset management companies often restrict portfolio 
managers to holding stocks that are included in investible indices such as IFCI.  In order 
to be included in the IFCI, firms must pass minimum size and liquidity screens, in 
addition to being legally investible.  It is possible that the results thus far overstate the 
effects of diversification because DIFCOV proxies for omitted structural characteristics 
such as size and liquidity that are important practical determinants of asset demands. 
In order to account for the potential impact that size and liquidity considerations 
may have on the results, this subsection adds size and turnover measures to the right-hand 
side of equation (8).  The following regression examines the effect of DIFCOV on 
revaluation after controlling for size: 
11 2
34 5
ln( [0]) ( * )
(* )(* )
ij ij ij ij
ij ij ij j ij
StockPrice Invest DIFCOV DIFCOV INVEST
Earn SIZE INVEST SIZE NONINVEST CNTRY
α βγ γ
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            (9) 
For a given firm, SIZE is defined as the ratio of that firm’s market capitalization to the 
total domestic market capitalization as of one year prior to the liberalization date. 
Specification (3a) reports the results.  The revaluation for investible firms remains 
positively and significantly related to DIFCOV after controlling for SIZE.  In Panel A, 
the point estimate of DIFCOV is 3.47 and significant at the 1 percent level.  After   25
controlling for SIZE in Panel B, the point estimate of DIFCOV is 4.64 and significant at 
the 1 percent level.  In both Panels A and B, the conditional effect of DIFCOV for 
investible firms remains statistically insignificant.  The coefficient on DIFCOV*INVEST 
indicates that the marginal effect of DIFCOV for investible firms continues to be 
significantly larger than that of the non-investible firms.  The coefficient on the SIZE 
variable is not significant in any of the specifications  
The following regression explores whether the positive relationship between the 
unexpected stock price change and the change in covariance persists after controlling for 
liquidity, as measured by turnover: 
11 2
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           (10) 
For a given firm, the variable TURNOVER is defined as the sum of the dollar value of all 
shares traded over a 12-month period before the liberalization (t= -24 to t= -12) divided 
by that firm’s total market capitalization.  The total market capitalization number for the 
firm is taken at t=-12.   
Regression (4a) in Panel A of Table 5 shows that after controlling for the effect of 
liquidity on the stock price revaluation for investible firms, the sum of the coefficients on 
DIFCOV and DIFCOV*INVEST is 3.25 and significant at the 1 percent level.   
Regression (4b) in Panel B of Table 5 shows that the sum of the coefficients on DIFCOV 
and DIFCOV*INVEST is 4.44 and significant at the 1 percent level.  In both Panels A 
and B, the conditional effect of DIFCOV for investible firms remains statistically 
insignificant.  The coefficient on DIFCOV*INVEST indicates that the marginal effect of 
DIFCOV for investible firms continues to be significantly larger than that of the non-  26
investible firms.  The variable TURNOVER is statistically insignificant for the investible 
firms and enters negatively and significantly for the non-investible firms.  
 
4D.  Summary 
On balance, the evidence suggests that risk sharing helps explain the revaluation 
effect for investible firms only.  The marginal effect of DIFCOV for investible firms is 
significantly larger than that of the non-investible firms in all specifications. The 
hypothesis that the impact of DIFCOV on the stock price revaluation is the same for 
investible and non-investible firms is rejected in the benchmark specification as well as 
those that include controls for earnings, size, and liquidity.  The common shock, as 
measured by the coefficient on the constant term, is positive and significant in all 
specifications.  Importantly, the marginal effect of INVEST on the constant term is 
statistically insignificant in all specifications.  This means that the intercept term is in fact 
the same for investible and non-investible firms.  This second piece of evidence provides 
further confirming evidence in support of the theory. 
It is useful to check the plausibility of the results by performing some crude 
calculations and comparing them to the raw data.  For investible firms, the sample 
average of DIFCOV is 0.018.  Multiplying this number by 2.74 (the estimate from Panel 
A (Column 1) in Table 5) gives 0.049, the total effect of DIFCOV for investible firms.  
Adding 0.049 to the coefficient on the constant, which is 0.06, yields 0.109.  Thus, the 
total predicted revaluation for the investible firms is 10.9 percent in real dollar terms.  
The average revaluation in the raw data for investible firms is equal to 15 percent.  The 
analogous calculation for the non-investible firms yields a predicted revaluation of 6.3   27
percent.  The average revaluation in the raw data for non-investible firms is equal to 9.9 
percent. 
 
5.  Discussion 
Typical analyses of the gains from international trade in risky assets calibrate the 
hypothetical welfare losses associated with the lack of risk sharing (French and Poterba, 
1991; Lewis, 1999; Tesar, 1995; Tesar and Werner, 1998;).  This paper takes a different 
approach.  It analyzes the revaluation of the prices of publicly traded shares that actually 
occurs when emerging economies open their stock markets to foreign investors.  Strictly 
speaking, stock price revaluations measure the change in real wealth that accrues to 
domestic shareholders, not utility gains per se.  Nevertheless, stock market liberalizations 
provide useful natural experiments, because changes in real equity prices have 
implications for other macroeconomic variables that have broader welfare implications 
(Frankel, 1994; Henry 2000b; Stulz 1999a; Tesar and Werner, 1998). 
Asset pricing theory predicts that levels of expected stock returns should vary 
cross-sectionally according to the level of firms' exposure to systematic risks.  Research 
in the last several years has produced little empirical evidence in support of this claim 
(for surveys see Campbell, 2000; Cochrane, 1999; Fama, 1991).  Systematic risk factors 
show little indication that they are priced cross-sectionally.  Many firm characteristics 
that are priced cross-sectionally do not resemble systematic risk.  Much of the research in 
this area has focused on the predictive ability of the CAPM for levels of systematic risk 
and expected returns.  This paper focuses on an experiment in which the level of   28
systematic risk changes and demonstrates that expected returns move in a direction that is 
consistent with the theory.   
It is important to understand whether stock prices respond to changes in risk, 
because stock prices provide public signals of real investment opportunities.  If 
liberalization leads to a fall in the riskiness of a firm, then, all else equal, its stock price 
should increase.  In theory, the jump in stock prices that occurs at liberalization is the 
most direct signal that the policy change has reduced the cost of capital.  All else equal, 
the optimal response to a fall in the cost of capital is to increase investment. On the 
other hand, if the stock price increases associated with liberalization are unrelated to 
diversification, then the optimal investment response is less clear (Blanchard, Rhee and 
Summers, 1993; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Wurgler, 2000). 
Morck et al. (2000) document evidence that stock prices in emerging economies 
contain relatively little firm-specific information.  This conclusion may be right in 
general.  However, this paper suggests that emerging market stock prices do convey 
information about firm-specific changes in risk when the economy is opened to foreign 
portfolio investment.  More generally, the result that stock prices move in line with 
changes in systematic risk provides a first step toward understanding whether physical 
capital is efficiently reallocated when barriers to capital movements are removed.    29
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Figure 1.  Differences Between Covariances with the Market and World Portfolio Help Explain  the 
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Figure 2.   Differences Between Covariances with the Market and World Portfolio Do Not Help Explain 
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Figure 3.  Differences Between Covariances with the Market and Non-Investible Portfolio Do Not Help Explain the 
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Table 1.  Stock Market Liberalization Dates 
Country    Date of Stock Market 
Liberalization 
Argentina   September  1989 
Brazil   May  1991 
Chile   October  1989 
Colombia   December  1991 
India   November  1992 
Korea   January  1992 
Mexico   May  1989 
Pakistan   February  1991 
Taiwan   January  1991 
Turkey   August  1989 
Venezuela   January  1990 
Note:  Each date corresponds to the earliest stock 
market liberalization that occurs after 12/88, which is 




Table 2. Comparison of Mean and Median Stock Price Responses to Liberalization for Investible and Non-Investible Firms 
 Panel  A 
Investible 
Firms 
 Panel  B 
Non-Investible 
Firms 
 T-test  of 
difference 




























248 0.151  0.121  43   
(0.00) 
 181  0.099  0.086  83   
(0.149) 
  Yes*              
                    
Argentina  14 0.639 











  Yes**            
                   
Brazil  21  -0.052    
(-1.029)    
-0.048 10   
(0.00) 
 23  -0.198 
 (-3.802)       
-0.048 11   
(0.5) 
  Yes*              
                   
Chile  9 0.048   
(1.20)       
0.071 4   
(0.5) 
 17  0.141   
(5.023)       
0.177 8   
(0.5) 
  Yes**            
                   
Colombia  5 0.354   
(4.223)      
0.419 2   
(0.5) 
 15  0.287 
(6.312)       
0.310 7   
(0.5) 
  No               
                   
India  39 0.208 
(4.663)       
0.172 7   
(0.00) 
 23  -0.024 
(-0.435)       
-0.054 17   
(0.994) 
  Yes***           
                   
Korea  66 0.551   
(11.37)        
0.584 7   
(0.00) 
  6  0.069   
(0.406)    
-0.047 3   
(0.656) 
  Yes***           
                   
Mexico  5 0.288   
(5.48)      
0.319 2   
(0.5) 
 36  0.247   
(8.813)       
0.223 12   
(0.033) 
  No               
                   
Pakistan  5 -0.239 
 (–2.154)       
-0.136 1 
 (0.188) 
 38  -.01 
(-0.478)       
0.004 19   
(0.564) 
  Yes***           
                   
Taiwan  69 0.329   
(11.899)       
0.332 4   
(0.00) 
 0  N/A  N/A  N/A    N/A 
                   
Turkey  10 0.654   
(8.532)       
0.577 4   
(0.00) 
 5  0.509   
(10.01)       
0.577 2   
(0.5) 
  Yes***           
                   
Venezuela  5 0.446   
(4.223)       
0.451 2   
(0.5) 
 8  0.478 
(4.723)        
0.451 4   
(0.637) 
  No               
Notes:  The mean liberalization return is the average stock price change in Month [0].  T-statistics are given in parentheses.  The median liberalization return is the 
median stock price change in Month [0].  Column 4 in Panels A and B reports the number of firms that experienced liberalization month returns that were below their 
own historical median return.  P-values for sign tests for the median returns are shown in parentheses.  The final column reports results from a T-test of the difference in 


















































                       
Size  0.015 
 
0.006     0.0004   0.129     0.023    0.014   
 
0.006      0.0002     0.135    0.019   No 
                       
Liquidity  2.66 
 
0.43     0.003        26.9    5.11    0.249    0.083        0  2.35   0.364      Yes*** 





0.08  -4.20 5.80  1.02   0.10 
 
0.05 -4.01  6.50  1.11    Yes** 





1.72  -1.27    78.0  6.12    1.48 
 
1.03 -3.30  7.75  1.50    Yes*** 
                       







0.017   0.01  0.004  -0.038  0.069 0.016    Yes*** 
Notes: Size=market capitalization as a fraction of total market capitalization, liquidity =annual turnover, earnings growth=annual growth rate of real earnings, market to 
book = market value of equity to book of equity, and DIFCOV = difference in covariance between the local and world markets.  The final column reports results from a t-
















      
[+1]  -0.217***   
(0.066)      
-0.393***   
(0.090)      
Yes** 
     
[+2]  -0.230***   
(0.068)      
-0.113    
(0.099)      
No 
 
     
[+3] -0.106 
   (0.068 )       
-0.014    
(0.101)      
No 
 
     
Constant  0.027   
 (0.024)       
-0.036    
(0.035)      
 
Notes: [+1], [+2] and [+3] report growth rates of real earnings in the first, second and 
third year following the liberalization.  Country-fixed effects are included in all 
regressions but are not reported.  The F-test reports results about the statistical 
significance of the difference in the mean growth rates for investible and non-
investible firms.  (*), (**) and (***) refer to 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels of significance, repectively.    
 Table 5.  Does Diversification Drive Stock Price Revaluations? 
 Panel  A: 
 Month [0] Window 
 
 Panel  B: 
Month [0,+1]Window 
 
 (1a)  (2a)  (3a)  (4a)  (5a)    (1b)  (2b)  (3b)  (4b)  (5b) 
DIFCOV  0.331 
(1.01)   
-0.122 
(1.31) 
-0.660   
(1.361)      
0.294   
(1.315) 
-0.283   


















4.132***   
(1.339)       














                  
Earnings  
Surprise [+1] 
 0.015   
(0.013)  
0.016   
(0.013)       
0.016   
(0.013) 
0.018   
(0.013)       








                  
SIZE*INVEST      -0.59   
(0.57)      
 -0.72 
(0.57)      




                  
SIZE* 
NONINVEST 
   0.381   
(0.752)       
  0.387   
(0.749)  




                  
TURNOVER* 
INVEST 
      -0.002   
(0.003)    
-0.003   
(0.003)      




                  
TURNOVER* 
NONINVEST 
      -0.104*   
(0.052)      
-0.11**   
(0.05) 




                  




0.06***   
(0.02)       
0.066***   








(0.022)       
0.10*** 
(0.021)   
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
                  




0.004   
(0.04) 














                  
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.18 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12    0.16  0.16  0.13 0.15  0.13 
                  
Number Obs.  410 317  316 317 316    410  317 316 317 316 
Notes for Table 5: The LHS side variable in Panel A is the abnormal return in the liberalization month.  The LHS variable in Panel B is the cumulative abnormal return in the liberalization month 
plus   one month.  The symbol DIFCOV is the difference between the historical covariance of firm i's stock return with the local market and its covariance with the Morgan Stanley Capital Market 
Index (MSCI) world stock market index.  Country-fixed effects are included in all regressions but are not reported.  INVEST is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for investible firms and 
zero for non-investible firms.  SIZE is defined as the ratio of that firm’s market capitalization to the total domestic market capitalization as of one year prior to the liberalization date.  TURNOVER is 
defined as the sum of the dollar value of all shares traded over a 12-month period before the liberalization (t= -24 to t= -12) divided by that firm’s total market capitalization.  Earnings Surprise [+1] 
is the deviation of the growth rate of earnings from its pre-liberalization mean in year [+1] following the liberalization.  (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent, respectively.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within parentheses. 
 